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Karro: Common Sense About Common Claims

COMMON SENSE ABOUT COMMON CLAIMS
David G. Karro*

I. A FORTY-YEAR-OLD NIGHTMARE COMES TO LIFE

Class actions are so accepted a part of federal litigation that people
forget what a departure they are from "our deep-rooted historic tradition
that everyone should have his own day in court."' Under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 which authorizes those departures,
"all members of the class, whether of a plaintiff or a defendant class, are
bound by the judgment entered in the action unless .. .they make a
timely election for exclusion.", 3 Not all class members have the right to
elect exclusion, however; in many cases, courts are not required to give
class members notice that they are in a class, let alone an opportunity to
do anything about it. 4 Under the Rule, it is therefore possible for

* Postal Service Law Department Litigation Attorney, 1975-2008. J.D., University of Wisconsin
School of Law, 1969. B.A., Oberlin College, 1964. The author worked as a staff attorney for the
Roanoke Valley Legal Aid Society in Virginia from 1969-1972, when he became the Society's
General Counsel. For thirty years, the author has defended the Postal Service in EEO and other
cases in numerous federal district courts and in all thirteen United States Courts of Appeals. He
founded a boutique legal services firm specializing in writing memoranda and briefs for litigators.
For more information or to contact the author email him at Briefs4Lawyers@gmail.com. The views
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United
States Postal Service.
1. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755, 762 (1989)); see Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617-18 (1997) ("[In recent
decades] class action practice has become ever more 'adventuresome'....").
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. On December 1, 2007, Rule 23 was amended, according to the
revisor's notes, "to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent
throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only." In this article, all quotations
from the Rule are as it stood prior to that revision.
3. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 379 (1996) (quoting 2 HERBERT H.
NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2755 (1977)).
4. E.g., Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999) ("If the action
proceeds under Rule 23(b)(3), then each member of the class must receive notice and an opportunity
to opt out and litigate (or not) on his own behalf If it proceeds under Rule 23(b)(2), by contrast,
then no notice will be given, and no one will be allowed to opt out. Because of this difference, Rule
23(b)(2) gives the class representatives and their lawyers a much freer hand than does Rule
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someone to first learn of his membership when he sues a defendant, only
to learn by way of a plea of res judicata that somebody has already
presented his claim for him, and lost it.
When a judge "certifies" a class-when he permits a plaintiff to
represent other people-he certifies that he has satisfied himself that the
plaintiff can so fully present the claims of other people that there is no
need to give them a chance to speak for themselves. This would not be
difficult if certification could be reserved for cases the class members
will win, as people don't usually mind favorable judgments. But Rule 23
requires that certification decisions be made early in a federal case,
before the outcome is predictable.6
In these circumstances, one might expect judges to approach
certification warily, and to press aspiring representatives to explain why,
exactly, they think it will be fair to bind class members if things don't go
as well as they hope. Yet, I have never heard a judge ask questions like
that before certifying a class, and I have had no luck compelling those
seeking class certification to answer interrogatories propounding that
question. There are many considerations to weigh before certifying a
class, 7 but ensuring there is nothing unfair about locking
an entire class
8
of people out of the courtroom surely heads the list.

23(b)(3).").
5. Rule 23 authorizes defendant classes, as well as plaintiff classes, but the great majority of
class actions involve plaintiff classes suing defendants, and I shall assume that to be the case
throughout this article. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a).
6. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(1) ("When a person sues or is sued as a representative of a class, the
court must-at an early practicable time--determine by order whether to certify the action as a class
action."); cf Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 163 (1982) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
("[A] judge's decision to certify a class is not normally to be evaluated by hindsight ... since the
judge cannot know what the evidence will show ....
").
7. E.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997) ("[Class actions satisfy]
concerns about the efficient use of court resources and the conservation of funds to compensate
claimants who do not line up early in a litigation queue."); Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 159 (1982) ("[T]he efficiency and economy of litigation.., is a principal purpose of the
procedure.") (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974)); Deposit Guar.
Nat'l Bank of Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("Where it is not economically
feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits
for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the
class-action device.").
8. Cf H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 432 n.9 (1981) (Marshall, J.,dissenting) ("The
binding effect of the class action's disposition poses serious due process concerns where the
interests of class members are not properly represented.") (citing 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed.

2005)).
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Yet, many judges are biased in favor of certification, 9 and others
require little more to go on than allegations suggesting widespread
wrongdoing.10 Forty years ago, Chief Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit
warned:
Over-technical limitation of classes by the district courts will drain the
life out of Title VII [a statute prohibiting employment discrimination],
as will unduly narrow scope of relief once discriminatory acts are
found. But without reasonable specificity the court cannot define the
class, cannot determine whether the representation is adequate, and the
employer does not know how to defend. And, what may be most
significant, an over-broad framing of the class may be so unfair to the
absent members as to approach, if not amount to, deprivation of due
process. Envision the hypothetical attorney with a single client, filing a
class action to halt all racial discrimination in all the numerous plants
and facilities of one of America's mammoth corporations.... It is tidy,
convenient for the courts fearing a flood of Title VII cases, and dandy
for the employees if their champion wins. But what of the catastrophic
consequences if the plaintiff loses and carries the class down with him,
or policy can be
or proves only such limited facts that no practice
11
class?
the
sinking
but
afloat
him
leaving
found,

9. See, e.g., Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, 435 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006)
("When reviewing a denial of class certification, we accord the district court noticeably less
deference than when we review a grant of certification." (citing Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co.,
331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 2003))); Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003)
'
("[F]ederal courts should 'give Rule 23 a liberal rather than a restrictive construction ....
(quoting In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir. 1989))); Liles v. Am. Corrective
Counseling Servs., 231 F.R.D. 565, 572-73 (S.D. Iowa 2005) ("It is well-settled that: 'When doubt
exists concerning certification of the class, the court should err in favor of allowing the case to
proceed as a class action."' (quoting Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 227 F.R.D. 362, 372 (E.D.
Pa. 2005))); Robinson v. Gillespie, 219 F.R.D. 179, 183 (D. Kan. 2003) ("When in doubt, a court
should err in favor of the maintenance of a class action." (citing Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99
(10th Cir. 1968))); In re Deutsche Telekom AG Sec. Litig., 229 F. Supp. 2d 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) ("Courts have recognized that class actions are generally appropriate when plaintiffs seek
redress for violations of the securities laws." (citing In re Blech Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 97, 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
10. See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 293 (2d Cir. 1999)
(common claim established by "evidence that tends to establish that being Black has a statistically
significant effect on an employee's likelihood of being promoted .... "); Shipes v. Trinity Indus.,
987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Allegations of similar discriminatory employment practices,
such as the use of entirely subjective personnel processes that operate to discriminate, satisfy the
commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)." (citing Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin
State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 617 (5th Cir. 1983))).
11. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J.,
concurring.).
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Judge Godbold's vision became a reality in 2004, when a district court
judge certified six women as the representatives of "[a]ll women
employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since
December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart's
challenged pay and management track promotions policies and
practices." 12 Seven women brought the case, but neither the district
court nor the court of appeals thought it necessary to say which of the
seven were the representatives.1 3 Perhaps they thought the women were
fungible, for neither court thought their individual claims 1or
4
circumstances worth discussing, or even describing, except in passing.
In any event, the district court authorized six of the seven plaintiffs
to speak for what the court of appeals would later say was a class of
"approximately 1.5 million employees, both salaried and hourly, with a
range of positions, who are or were employed at one or more of WalMart's 3,400 stores across the country,"' 5 and to claim on their behalf
that "women employed in Wal-Mart stores: (1) are paid less than men in
comparable positions ... and (2) receive fewer-and wait longer forpromotions to in-store management positions than men."'1 6 Membership
in the class is mandatory, and nobody is entitled to exclude herself
except in one peculiar respect: the certification order permits class
members to "opt-out of claims for punitive damages., 17 Everything else,
including the all-important issue of Wal-Mart's liability for any
damages, will be litigated by the representatives-everything, that is,
except the right to compensatory damages, which the representatives told
the court they are not seeking on behalf of the class. 18 The court did not
explain why it authorized the representatives to waive other people's

12. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Dukes 1), 222 F.R.D. 137, 188 (D. Cal. 2004), aff'd 509
F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
13. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (Dukes 11), 509 F.3d 1168, 1195 n.12 (Kleinfeld, J.

dissenting) ("The plaintiffs' names add up to seven: Dukes, Surgeson, Arana, Williamson, Gunter,
Kwapnoski, Cleo. The district court and the majority say there are six named plaintiffs. One not

concerned with individual justice may not care about one woman more or less, but in our system we
must and do.").
14. Dukes 1, 222 F.R.D. at 166 ("[Plaintiffs' evidence] raises an inference that Wal-Mart
engages in discriminatory practices in compensation and promotion that affect all plaintiffs in a

common manner.").
15.
16.

Dukes 11, 509 F.3d at 1176-77.
Id. at 1174. But see id. at 1195 n.12 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (making the somewhat

unsettling observation that seven plaintiffs brought the action rather than the six identified by the
district court and the majority).
17.

Id.at1188.

18. Id.at1174.
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claims for compensatory damages.
The district court did not want its certification order "construed in
any manner as a ruling on the merits or the probable outcome of the
case," and was thus open to the possibility that Wal-Mart might
prevail. ' 9 Yet, it did not explore the consequences of a judgment adverse
to the class. Nor did it explain why it was authorizing the representatives
to waive the right of 1.5 million women to seek compensatory damages,
without giving them any say in the matter. The size of the class gave it
pause, but, it noted that Title VII,20 the anti-discrimination statute
invoked by the representatives, "contains no special exception for large
employers., 2 1 Which is true: Title VII says nothing about class actions
at all.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, looking to Rule 23
rather than Title VII. The majority was uneasy about including women in
the class who had left Wal-Mart employment before the action was filed
in June 2001, and it wanted the district court to give that part of its order
more thought.22 Otherwise, it seemed to have no problems with the
scope of the class. It did consider and reject Wal-Mart's argument that
the company's due process rights were threatened by the proposed
proceedings, 23 but did not consider the possibility that the members'
rights to due process might be threatened too. Perhaps that was because
there was nobody to speak for the class members. Wal-Mart had no
incentive to challenge the decision to free it of liability for compensatory
damages or to emphasize the unfairness of allowing it res judicata relief
if dissatisfied members sue later. In the end, the court said: "We hold
that the district court acted within its broad discretion in concluding that
it would be better to handle this case as a class action instead of clogging
the federal courts with innumerable individual suits litigating the same
issues repeatedly., 2 4 Which is odd, for the district court said nothing of
the sort.
As we shall see in Part II, however, the appellate court did not seem
confident that "innumerable individual[s]" will still be in the class when
the case is over.25 And it must have known that the Supreme Court has

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Dukes 1, 222 F.R.D. at 142.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
Dukes 1, 222 F.R.D. at 142.
Dukes II, 509 F.3d at 1189.
Id.at 1191.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
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refused to bind the individual absent members of a class that lost a
pattern or practice employment discrimination action, so long as they did
not present the same pattern or practice theory that had already failed.
In Part 1II, we will see that the majority managed to square the
district court's unwieldy class with the requirements of Rule 23 by
finding that the plaintiffs have evidence of a pattern or practice of
discrimination. That evidence will then be evaluated at trial, along with
the defendant's evidence, and a decision can then be made as to whether
the evidence actually proves the plaintiffs case. It is therefore not clear
what the purpose of the certification order is, as the findings that validate
it will be made later.
And in Part IV, we will see that many courts, probably including
both Wal-Mart courts, use class actions as a way of authorizing class
counsel to enforce statutes the courts deem important.26 Yet, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot expand a plaintiff's standing to
challenge acts and practices. A plaintiff who does not represent a class
has standing to ask the court to enjoin any practice or act that aggrieves
him, and cannot broaden that standing by challenging acts or practices
that do not aggrieve him, even if he represents people they do aggrieve.
Class treatment, then, adds nothing to the ability of a litigant to enforce a
statute.27
Although the focus here is on the Wal-Mart decision, the Ninth
Circuit did nothing that other courts don't do; it just did it more
ambitiously than anyone else. This, then, is an article about wide-spread
misuse of Rule 23 in modern class actions, and the Wal-Mart decision is
a spectacular example of what has gone wrong.
II. RESURRECTING THE SPURIOUS CLASS ACTION

Like any federal action, a class action begins with a complaint
giving the defendant notice of the claims against it and people suing it: 28
"The policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants

.

.

.

are

satisfied," the Supreme Court has said
when ... a named plaintiff who is found to be representative of a class
commences a suit and thereby notifies the defendants not only of the
substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number
26.
27.
28.

See infra note 133.
See infra notes 144-47.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8, 10.
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and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in
the judgment. Within the period set by the statute of limitations, the
defendants have the essential information necessary to determine both
the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation, whether the
actual trial is conducted in the form of a class29action, as a joint suit, or
as a principal suit with additional intervenors.
Because plaintiffs who file such a complaint assert the right to speak for
people who have not asked them to do so, Rule 23 requires that the
district court review the assertion at the outset of the litigation 30 and
"define the class and class claims," for itself.31 Then, having identified
the absent parties and their claims, and certifying that the plaintiffs can
speak for those persons with respect to those claims, the court may
proceed to adjudicate the case in the usual manner.
However, many courts make use of what are, in effect,
"provisional" certification orders; orders allowing litigation to proceed
without finally committing the class attorneys to represent any particular
group of people. In Wal-Mart, the Ninth Circuit seemed to have had
something like that in mind; for it gave the district court's certification
order "very limited" review and went on to say:
Rule 23 provides district courts with broad discretion to determine
whether a class should be certified, and to revisit that certification
throughout the legal proceedings before the court.... If later evidence
disproves Plaintiffs' contentions that common issues predominate,
the
32
district court can at that stage modify or decertify the class.
The Court also discounted concerns about managing the behemoth it had
just approved for the same reason: the lower court's "discretion to
modify or decertify the class should it become unmanageable., 33 It is,
therefore, not yet clear which 1.5 million class members are entitled to
rely on the class attorneys to represent them, who Wal-Mart will litigate
against, or who will be bound by the judgment when the case is over.
Those decisions will apparently be made as the evidence comes in.

29. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(l)(A).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee's note (1966)
("In order to give clear definition to the action, this provision requires the court to determine, as
early in the proceedings as may be practicable, whether an action brought as a class action is to be
so maintained.").
32. Dukes 11, 509 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007).
33. Id.at1193.
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This approach to class certification contrasts sharply with the
Supreme Court's 1975 approach in Sosna v. Iowa,34 when a class
representative challenged an Iowa residency statute as unconstitutional.
While the case was before the Court, the representative's claim became
moot, and Iowa moved to dismiss the case.35 Although the Court agreed
that the representative had lost her own Article III standing to challenge
the residency requirement, it allowed the class members to proceed
without her, reasoning that the district court's certification order meant it
had been "contemplated that the [judgment would] bind all persons who
have been found at the time of certification to be members of the class,"
giving the members a "legal status separate from the [representative's]
interest .... ,36 The Court then approved the propriety
of the
3
certification order and affirmed the judgment against the class.
Sosna does not say what it means to "contemplate" that class
members will be bound by a judgment, but its holding that they had
Article III standing to proceed on their own is instructive.38 Litigants
cannot have standing unless it is "likely, as opposed to merely
'speculative,' that [their injuries] will be redressed by a favorable
decision, ' 39 and "contemplating" that class members will be bound by a
judgment must therefore mean that the court has satisfied itself that their
exclusion from the class is unlikely. 40 "After certification," Justice
Powell said in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty,4 1 "the case
is no different in principle from more traditional representative actions
involving, for example, a single party who cannot participate himself
because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate through an
34. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
35. Id. at 399.
36. Id. at 399 & n.8.
37. Id. at 410.
38. See id. at 402.
There must not only be a named plaintiff who has . . . a case or controversy at the time
the complaint is filed, and at the time the class action is certified by the District Court...
but there must be a live controversy at the time this Court reviews the case .. . .The
controversy may exist, however, between a named defendant and a member of the class
represented by the named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named plaintiff has
become moot.
Id.
39. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1995) (citations omitted) (setting out
elements of Article III standing); see also Simon v. E.Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39
(1976) ("The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke judicial power stand to profit in some
personal interest remains an Art. Ill requirement.").
40. SeeSosna, 419 U.S. at402.
41. U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 415 n.8 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
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appointed fiduciary. 42 It follows that a certification order should not be
approved on the theory that it can be modified if things don't work out;
the court must be satisfied that things will work out. A judge
contemplating the possibility of changes in the class definition is in no
position to contemplate that any particular member will be bound by the
ultimate judgment.4 3
Rule 23 provides that certification orders "may be altered or
amended before final judgment," 44 and courts that certify classes must be
alert to the possibility that they erred and may need to make
corrections. 45 Yet, the Wal-Mart majority did not seem to be talking
about correcting errors, but about tailoring the class definition to the
evidence as it develops. The power to alter or amend an order is not an
invitation to enter orders that will have to be altered or amended, any
more than the power to alter or amend a judgment is an invitation to
enter a judgment that will have to be altered or amended.46 Nor is it an
invitation to defer deciding the question of whether the class members
have standing to participate in the case. Standing, like all other
jurisdictional questions, must be decided at the outset of any case

42. Id.
43. Cf Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir.
2007) ("[T]he plain text of Rule 23 requires the court to 'find,' not merely assume, the facts
favoring class certification." (quoting Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2005)));
In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[A] district court may not
grant class certification without making a determination that all of the Rule 23 requirements are
met."); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A]n order certifying
a class usually is the district judge's last word on the subject; there is no later test of the decision's
"). But see, e.g., Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152, 163 (3d Cir. 1985)
factual premises ....
("Initially framing the class in broad strokes and later filling in the details is a standard practice of
courts faced with difficult class actions in which several relevant facts will not become known until
discovery is well underway.").
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
45. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) ("[The court normally has] the
opportunity ... when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they
unfold."); London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1254 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[B]asic
consideration of fairness requires that a court undertake a stringent and continuing examination of
the adequacy of representation by the named class representative[] at all stages of the litigation
where absent members will be bound by the court's judgment." (alteration in original) (quoting
Shroder v. Suburban Coastal Corp., 729 F.2d 1371, 1374 (1 lth Cir. 1984))); In Re Integra Realty
Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1112 (10th Cir. 2001) ("Once the decision to certify a class has been
made, the court remains under a continuing duty to monitor the adequacy of representation to ensure
that class counsel provides zealous, competent representation through the proceedings and to
address conflicts of interests if they develop."); Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1145
(8th Cir. 1999) ("A district court has a duty to assure that a class once certified continues to be
certifiable .... ").
46. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a), 60(b) (authorizing courts to alter or amend final judgments).
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brought in a federal court.4 7
Even if the Wal-Mart majority did not contemplate that changes in
the class definition would occur, it would be hard to believe that it meant
its statement about barring "innumerable individual suits" to be taken
literally. The Wal-Mart representatives hope to prove a "pattern-or
practice" claim of discrimination,48 yet the Supreme Court held in
Cooper v. FederalReserve Bank49 that an adverse judgment in a pattern
or practice case does not bar individual actions by absent members. In
Cooper, a bank objected to being sued for race discrimination in
employment by individual members of a class that had just lost a case
against it for a pattern or practice of race discrimination in
employment. 50 The Supreme Court overruled the objection with the
commonsense observation that "rejection of a claim of classwide
discrimination does not warrant the conclusion that no member of the
class could have a valid individual claim., 51 The Court held that the
class action judgment resolved only the class claims, as well as any
individual claims that had actually surfaced during the class
proceedings.52 But class members whose individual claims had not been
considered were free to try their own luck at suing the bank, provided
they based their right to relief on the animus of a supervisor, manager or,
perhaps, on the policy of a department or other unit smaller than the
bank. 53 It follows that Wal-Mart class members will be free to sue the
store if their representatives lose, unless they appear individually in the
district court proceedings. And, that is not likely to happen on a large
scale; the district court made it clear that it has no intention of allowing

47. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) ("In its constitutional dimension, standing
imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case or controversy' between himself
and the defendant within the meaning of Art. 111.
This is the threshold question in every federal case,
determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.").
48. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168, 1190 n.16 (9th Cir. 2007).
49. 467 U.S. 867 (1984).
50. See id.at 878.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 873 n.7 ("Two [individual] claims were rejected by the District Court [during the
class proceedings] and two by the Court of Appeals; all four of those determinations are now
equally final."). "That [class action] judgment (1)bars the class members from bringing another
class action against the Bank alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination for the relevant time
period and (2) precludes the class members in any other litigation with the Bank from relitigating
the question whether the Bank engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against black
employees during the relevant time period. The judgment is not, however, dispositive of ... the
individual claims .. " Id. at 880.
53. See id.
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54
innumerable members to participate in the class action.
Cooper seems to be a straightforward application of the due process
rule that "the judgment in a class action will bind only those members of
the class whose interests have been adequately represented by existing
parties to the litigation . . . . ,55 The representatives' pattern-or-practice
theory required proof of a bank-wide policy of discrimination, but did
not require exploration of the possibility that class members were
subjected to the bias of particular supervisors or departments.56 The
collapse of the one-size-fits-all theory therefore left members with
individual claims that had not been fully aired, and they were free to see
if lawyers devoted to their own interests could do better for them than
the lawyers who represented the class.57 The Cooper Court explained:

The crucial difference between an individual's claim of discrimination
and a class action alleging a general pattern or practice of
discrimination is manifest. The inquiry regarding an individual's claim
is the reason for a particular employment decision, while "at the
liability stage of a pattern-or-practice trial the focus often will not be
on individual hiring
decisions, but on a pattern of discriminatory
58
decisionmaking."
Because the Cooper Court prefaced its holding with the observation that
"a properly entertained class action is binding on class members in any
subsequent litigation," its refusal to bind class members suggests the
class action against the bank was not "properly entertained"; that, in
other words, the district court erred in certifying the class in the first
place.59 Yet, Cooper is generally read to mean something quite
different; that pattern or practice actions may be brought on behalf of a
class without jeopardizing the members' right to seek relief for
54. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 174 (2004) ("Given that the scope of
the instant class is company-wide, Defendant is no more entitled to 3,244 individual store-by-store
trials than it would be entitled to try each class member's individual claim in a case of smaller
scope."), aff'd, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
55. Sam Fox Publ'g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 691 (1961) (citing Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940)).
56. See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 875-76.
57. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 801 (1996) ("[A] prior proceeding, to
have binding effect on absent parties, would at least have to be 'so devised and applied as to insure
that those present are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to
insure the full and fair consideration of the common issue."' (citing Hansberrv, 311 U.S. at 43)).
58. Cooper, 467 U.S. at 876 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
360 n.46 (1977)).
59. Id. at 874.
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themselves.6 ° Pattern or practice actions, in this view, differ from
individual actions in that they raise different6 1 claims, and the resolution of
one claim is not the resolution of the other.
That is an extremely unlikely reading of Cooper, for several
reasons. For one thing, it would have the Supreme Court endorsing the
notion that an individual denied a single promotion may seek relief for
losing one promotion twice-first as a class member and then as an
For another, the Supreme Court's employment
individual.62
discrimination jurisprudence militates against the idea that pattern-orpractice claims exist apart from individual claims. 63 The antidiscrimination statute invoked by the Cooper representatives "requires
[a] focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes," 64 and
claims of intentional discrimination in employment-the Court calls
them "disparate treatment" claims-turn on whether individual
claimants were subjected to a discriminatory animus.6765 This is as true in
66
individual actions as in pattern-or-practice actions.
60. See, e.g., Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105-06 (10th Cir. 2001)
("If plaintiffs were simply attempting to collectively assert their individual claims of discrimination,
the decision to decertify would appear to be entirely proper. The problem, however, is that plaintiffs
were asserting a pattern-or-practice claim . . . . [T]he district court . . . failed to recognize the

pattem-or-practice nature of the class claim."); accord 4 LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 81.11 [1] (2d ed. 2003) ("Preserving the individual class member's right to action
on claims not involving common questions is thus consistent with the purpose of Rule 23."); 18A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 4455 (2d ed. 2002) ("The purpose of the [Cooper] class action was to permit
disposition of the issues common to the class [and not individual claims].").
61. Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he pattern-orpractice method of proving discrimination is not available to individual plaintiffs .... [A] patternor-practice claim is focused on establishing a policy of discrimination; because it does not address
individual hiring decisions, it is inappropriate as a vehicle for proving discrimination in an
individual case." (citing Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th Cir. 1998),
vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999))); Diaz v. Ashcroft, 301 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116
(D.P.R. 2004).
62. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003); Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591,591 (1997); Gen. Tel. Co. ofthe Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158-59 (1982).
63. See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 878.
64. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
65. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 05-1074, slip op. at II (U.S. May 29,
2007) ("A disparate-treatment claim comprises two elements: an employment practice, and
discriminatory intent.").
66. See Fumco Constr. Corp., v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("The central focus of the
inquiry in a case such as this [individual case] is always whether the employer is treating 'some
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'
(quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 n.15 (1977))).
67. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical [in a disparate
treatment case], although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
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Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,68 for example, was an individual action
brought by two blacks who proved that the manager who denied them
promotions used derogatory terms to refer to blacks, thereby establishing
the manager's racial animus and creating a presumption that his
decisions reflected that animus. 69 The case was not over-the manager
could still rebut the presumption by showing he would have rejected one
or both had he evaluated them fairly 7 0-but proof of his animus
established a critical element of both plaintiffs' claims. 7' Similarly, in
Teamsters v. United States,72 the seminal pattern-or-practice case, the
government proved that a trucking company had a policy of hiring only
whites for better paying jobs, thereby establishing "racial discrimination
was the company's standard operating procedure" and creating a
presumption that the company's decisions reflected that animus-the
same presumption established in Ash.73 Again, the case was not overthe company could still rebut the presumption that it would have rejected
particular blacks had it considered them fairly-but each class member
had proven a critical element of his case.74 Thus, proof of the manager's
animus in Ash established a critical element of the plaintiffs' claims,75
just as proof of the discriminatory policy in Teamsters did for many
more people. 76 A pattern-or-practice claim differs from an individual
claim in the scope of the alleged animus; if a plaintiff claims it affected
enough personnel decisions, the case can move from one category to the
other.
Finally, the conventional reading of Cooper would have the

treatment.").
68. 546 U.S. 454 (2006).
69. Id.at 456.
70. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003) ("[A]n employer [may] 'avoid a
finding of liability . . . by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
allowed gender to play... a role [in its decision]."' (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 244 (1989))).
71. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 ("Proof of discriminatory motive is critical [in
a disparate
treatment case], although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment.").
72.

431 U.S. 324 (1977).

73. SeeAsh, 546 U.S. at 456-57.
74. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362 ("The proof of the pattern or practice supports an
inference that any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory
policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy. . . .[T]he the burden then rests on the
employer to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for
lawful reasons.").
75. See Ash, 546 U.S. at 455-56.
76. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362.
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Supreme Court sanctioning a procedure in which class members wait to
see how their representatives do before deciding whether to sue,
themselves. That has not been permitted since the old "spurious" class
action was abolished forty years ago, as the Court made clear in
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.V
Under Rule 23 as it stood prior to its extensive amendment in 1966,
a so-called "spurious" class action could be maintained when "the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class
is

. .

. several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting

the several rights and a common relief is sought." The Rule, however,
contained no mechanism for determining at any point in advance of
final judgment which of those potential members of the class claimed
in the complaint were actual members and would be bound by the
judgment. Rather, "[w]hen a suit was brought by or against such a
class, it was merely an invitation to joinder-an invitation to become a

fellow traveler
in the litigation, which might or might not be
78
accepted."
Terming this result an "abuse," the Court held Rule 23 was "designed, in
part, specifically to mend this perceived defect in the former Rule and to
assure that members of the class would be identified before trial on the
79
merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and judgments.
Now, "a determination whether an action shall be maintained as a class
action is made . . '[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of
an action brought as a class action .

.

. ,,'80 Class members entitled to

opt-out of the class must do so immediately or "abide by the final
judgment, whether favorable or adverse." 81 Yet the Cooper members
did not have to abide by the final judgment, making it difficult
to see
82
class.
23
Rule
proper
a
been
have
could
class
Cooper
the
how

77. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
78. Id. at 545-46 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1937)
(amended 2003)); 3B James WM. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 23.10 (2d ed. 1996)).
79. Id. at 547.

80. Id. (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) (1937)
(amended 2003)). The rule now provides that the determination must be made "at an early
practicable time," instead of"[a]s soon as practicable .... " Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
81.
82.

Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 549.
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985) ("Whether it wins or loses

on the merits, [defendant] has a distinct and personal interest in seeing the entire plaintiff class
bound by res judicata just as [defendant] is bound"); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867,
881 (1984).
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American Pipe was followed by Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,83 in
which a district court certified a class, and then, after a preliminary
hearing, convinced that the class was likely to win at trial, ordered the
defendant to pay most of the cost of notifying class members of their
right to opt-out of the class. 84 The Supreme Court disapproved of the
district court's decision to assess the merits of the case while members
were still free to opt-out.85
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives
a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of
a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class
action. Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the Rule by allowing a
representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without
first satisfying the requirements for it. He is thereby allowed to obtain a
determination on the merits of the claims advanced on behalf of the
class without any assurance that a class action may be maintained. This
procedure is directly contrary to the command of subdivision (c)(1)
that the court determine whether a suit denominated a class action may
be maintained as
such "as soon as practicable after the commencement
' 86
of [the] action."
Yet, the Cooper representatives secured the benefits of a class action and
obtained a determination on the merits of the claims they advanced on
behalf of the class, without binding the class members, making it
difficult to see how the Cooper class could have been a proper Rule 23
87
class.
In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,88 decided two
terms before Cooper, the Supreme Court reversed a certification order
because there was no "specific presentation identifying the questions of
law or fact that were common to the claims of respondent and of the9
8
members of the class [the putative representative] sought to represent.,
As a result:
The trial of this class action followed a predictable course. Instead
of raising common questions of law or fact, respondent's evidentiary

83.

417 U.S. 156 (1974).

84. Id. at 168.
85. Id. at 177.
86. Id. at 177-78 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)).
87. See Cooper, 467 U.S. 867, 880 (1984).
88. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
89. Id. at 158, 161.
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approaches to the individual and class claims were entirely different.
He attempted to sustain his individual claim by proving intentional
discrimination. He tried to prove the class claims through statistical
evidence of disparate impact. . . . As the District Court's bifurcated
findings on liability demonstrate, the individual and class claims might
as well have been tried separately. It is clear that the maintenance of
respondent's action as a class action did not advance "the efficiency
and economy
of litigation which is a principal purpose of the
90
procedure."
If individual and class claims are to be tried together, using the same
evidentiary approach, can there be a meaningful difference between an
individual claim and a class claim? And, if the representative for a class
of people loses his case and leaves the court having to re-try the
individual cases in addition to the failed class action, what "efficiency
and economy" is gained? When the Cooper Court said: "a judgment in a
properly entertained class action is binding on class members in any
subsequent litigation," it meant just that. 91
In sum, Wal-Mart may lose to every class member, but it can only
win against those whose individual claims are submitted to the district
92
court.
The court has simply approved an old-fashioned spurious class
action, on a truly grand scale.
III. BUT CAN THEY LOSE IN COMMON?
How can the Wal-Mart court have so badly missed the mark? Its
review of the lower court's certification order may have been "very
limited," but it was designed, the court said, to ensure that the lower
court "correctly selected and applied Rule 23's criteria. 93 Yet the court
affirmed the improbable conclusion that six people can represent 1.5
million people, any one of whom may want to prove that a particular
supervisor in the Wal-Mart hierarchy held her sex against her. 94 It does
not seem to have asked itself the question posed by the dissent: If the
representatives fail to prove Wal-Mart discriminated against everybody,
will it be reasonable to infer it discriminated against nobody? 95 Or, if it
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
bound by

Id. at 159 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974)).
Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984).
See Dukes 11, 509 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007).
Dukes//, 509 F.3d at 1176.
See id. at 1183-85.
Id. 509 F.3d at 1199 (Kleinfield, J., dissenting) ("All the members of the class will be
the judgment or settlement because, under Rule 23, the judgment 'shall include' all class
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did ask itself that question, it did not care that the only possible answer
would be "no."
Subsection (a) of Rule 23 provides certification is appropriate if,
among other things:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
parties
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
96
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
There is an obvious tension between the first and last requirements. If
litigants are too numerous to make joinder practicable, they are probably
too numerous to be adequately represented as a group; somebody's
interests are likely to get lost in the crowd.
The second and third requirements of Rule 23(a)-commonality
and typicality-alleviate that tension between the numerosity and
adequacy requirements, the Supreme Court has said, by "effectively
'limit[ing] the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named
plaintiff's claims.' 97 They serve, the Court said
as guideposts for determining whether under the particular
circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether
the named plaintiffs claim and the class claims are so interrelated that
the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately
protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore also tend to
merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement, although the
about the competency of class
latter requirement also raises concerns
98
counsel and conflicts of interest.
The only interrelationship of claims likely to assure the members
adequate representation is one that requires a class representative to
prove essential elements of everybody's claims if he is to prove his
own.99 Claims arising out of an airline crash would be interrelated in
that way, as the airline cannot be negligent to one passenger but not

members, 'whether or not favorable to the class.' What if the plaintiffs' class loses?" (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)).
96. FED. R.Civ. P. 23(a); Dukes 11, 509 F.3d at 1176.
97. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the
Sw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)).
98. Id. at 157 n.13.
99. See id. at 157-58.
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another, and a passenger chosen to represent the other passengers must
prove their claims to prove his. He would not so much be a
representative, as a litigant with a representative claim. If he presents his
claim competently, the court may reasonably tell the airline and other
passengers that one adjudication of the negligence issue is enough and
dispose of everybody's claim in the way it disposes of his.' 0 ° The claims
need not be identical in all respects-damages suffered by passengers in
the crash may vary, for example-but certification should be limited to
issues of interest to class members that the representative must prove if
he is to recover. 101
The key to commonality and typicality, then, is self-interest. If a
representative cannot win relief for himself without representing the
members of the putative class, a judge has a basis for certifying that he
will adequately represent those other members throughout the case. 102
When the case is over, a judge asked to bar disappointed members from
suing again will at least know the representative had an incentive to
avoid the disappointment. 103
Class action decisions frequently refer to the class representative's
individual claim, as distinct from the representative's class claim.l°4 But
100. Cf Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) ("Collateral estoppel, like
the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of
relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by
preventing needless litigation." (footnote omitted)).
101. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A) ("[A]n action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues .... ").
102. See, e.g., Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436 F.3d 461, 466-67 (4th Cir. 2006) ("The
representative party's interest in prosecuting his own case must simultaneously tend to advance the
interests of the absent class members. For that essential reason, plaintiffs claim cannot be so
different from the claims of absent class members that their claims will not be advanced by
plaintiffs proof of his own individual claim."); In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d 277, 303 (3d
Cir. 2005) ("Because the claims of all class members here depend upon the existence of [a
particular] scheme, 'their interests are sufficiently aligned [such] that the class representatives can
be expected to adequately pursue the interests of the absentee class members."' (alteration in
original) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283,
312 (3d Cir. 1998))); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182-83
(3d Cir. 2001) ("Typicality ensures the interests of the class and the class representatives are aligned
'so that the latter will work to benefit the entire class through the pursuit of their own goals."'
(quoting Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 141 (3d Cir. 1998))).
103. Cf Integra Realty Res., Inc. v. Fid. Capital Appreciation Fund, 262 F.3d 1089, 1112 (10th
Cir. 2001) ("Fidelity's purported conflicts did not render it inadequate to represent the [defendant]
class . . . . Although we recognize that Fidelity's potential liability far exceeded that of any other
class member, its interests were aligned with those of the other class members in that all concerned
wished to limit their liability to the lowest possible amount.").
104. E.g., Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1296 (5th Cir. 1994)
(upholding finding that class representative failed to prove class claim or individual claims); Pegues
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if a representative can prevail by proving an individual claim, how can a
court confidently certify at the outset that he will be focusing on the
class claim at the finish, months or years later? In Wal-Mart, for
example, the representatives can establish a presumptive right to relief
for themselves by proving the nationwide policy of discrimination they
alleged, by proving a regional, store-wide, or departmental, policy of
discrimination, or by proving their supervisors were biased. 105 Who can
certify that they won't, at some point in the proceedings, consciously or
unconsciously divert resources from the more ambitious class claim to a
more modest showing that will serve them equally well?' °6 For that
matter, who can certify that they won't use their ability to abandon some
or all of the class members as a bargaining chip in settlement talks?'0 7
v. Miss. State Emp. Serv., 899 F.2d 1449, 1451 (5th Cir. 1990) ("After... trial
.. .the trial court
dismissed the individual and class claims on the merits."); Valentino v. U.S. Postal Serv., 674 F.2d
56, 60-61 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The district court ... ruled against Valentino on both her individual
and class claims."); Johnson v. Garrett, No. 73-702-Civ-J-12, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8185, at *6-7
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 1991) ("At Stage One of the proceedings, the Court shall determine (1) the
individual claims of the named plaintiffs . . . and (2) the pattern and practice claims of the class.");
Ottaviani v. State Univ., 679 F. Supp. 288, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 875 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1989)
("Plaintiff Roberta Ottaviani is the class representative ....Each individual plaintiff brings separate
claims against [the defendant] ....");see also Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 593 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("Employees are unlikely to undertake a Title VII class action unless they feel that they
themselves have encountered discriminatory treatment. When it comes to whether the proposed
class meets the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), the mere fact that the undertaking involves
evidence of both individual and class discrimination is not determinative one way or the other.").
105. See Dukes 11, 509 F.3d 1168, 1178, 1184 (2007) (citing Dukes 1, 222 F.R.D. 137, 145
(N.D. Cal. 2004)).
106.

Cf, MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(B) (2007) ("A lawyer shall not

continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of
a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client ....
").
107. Dukes If, 509 F.3d at 1199 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) ("[Class action] lawyers have a
powerful financial incentive to settle the case on terms favorable to themselves, but not necessarily
favorable to their unknown clients with varying individual circumstances that are unknown to their
purported lawyers."); see also Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 32
(2d Cir. 2005) ("Finding that plaintiffs were abusing this private cause of action by bringing
meritless class actions-so-called 'strike suits' in the hope of coercing large settlements, Congress
enacted the PSLRA in 1995 to provide more stringent and uniform standards for securities fraud
class actions and other suits that alleged fraud in the securities markets." (citing Lander v. Hartford
Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2001))); Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 211
F.3d 1228, 1241 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Once one understands that the issues involved . .. are
predominantly case-specific in nature, it becomes clear that there is nothing to be gained by
certifying this case as a class action; nothing, that is, except the blackmail value of a class
certification that can aid the plaintiffs in coercing the defendant into a settlement."); In re GMC
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[C]lass actions
create the opportunity for a kind of legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous plaintiff might
use the threat of a large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, to extract a settlement far
in excess of the individual claims' actual worth.").
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There is no discussion in the Wal-Mart majority opinion of the
representatives' claims or individual circumstances, just a passing
reference to the fact that one holds a salaried management position and
the others hold hourly positions.108 That is not much to go on when
trying to determine if anyone's claims are "so interrelated [with theirs]
that [her] interests . . . will be fairly and adequately protected in [her]

absence,"10 9 and the court did not try. Instead, it accepted the lower
court's determination that the representatives' evidence of a "'significant
proof of a corporate policy of discrimination"110° established
commonality, for it thought that evidence could prove that:
[E]ven though individual employees in different stores with different
managers may have received different levels of pay and were denied
promotion or promoted at different rates, because the discrimination
they allegedly suffered occurred

through an alleged common

practice-e.g., excessively subjective decision-making in a corporate
culture of uniformity and gender stereotyping-their
claims may be
11
sufficiently typical to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3).
Had the court been able to affirm a finding that a corporate policy
of discrimination existed, it would be easy to see why it thought the class
representatives had claims common to, and typical of, the class
members, for people challenging the same policy for the same reason
have a common claim. 1 2 But there was no such finding to affirm; the
lower court explicitly stated that it did not want its certification order
"construed... as a ruling on the merits or the probable outcome of the
case." 11 3 In plain terms, then, it deferred deciding whether a corporate
policy of discrimination actually exists until trial, when "both parties

108. Dukes I1, 509 F.3d at 1184-85 ("There is no dispute that the class representatives are
'typical' of the hourly class members, because almost all of the class representatives hold hourly
positions. Instead, Wal-Mart contends that the class representatives are not typical of all female instore managers because only one of six class representative holds a salaried management position,
and she holds a somewhat low-level position. However, because all female employees faced the
same alleged discrimination, the lack of a class representative for each management category does
not undermine Plaintiffs' certification goal." (citing Hartman v. Duffey, 19 F.3d 1459, 1471 (D.C.
Cir. 1994))).
109. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.18 (1982).
110. Dukes I1, 509 F.3d at 1178.
Ill. Id. at 1184 (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-33 (1977) (finding that class
representative establishes minimum height and weight requirement for prison guards discriminates
on the basis of sex).
113. Dukes 1, 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff'd, 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
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will present evidence on the issue of whether any disparities between
male and female employees with respect to pay and promotion are the
result of a pattern or practice of intentional gender discrimination or
legitimate factors."' 1 4 The court of appeals not only approved the lower
court's refusal to find the policy establishing commonality and
typicality, but added a disclaimer, of its own, saying its "findings [also]
relate only to class action procedural questions; we neither analyze nor
1 15
reach the merits of Plaintiffs' allegations of gender discrimination."'
Thus, Wal-Mart may yet defeat the claims of commonality and
typicality at trial, but it will deprive itself of the benefits of a class action
if it does. Perhaps that is what the court of appeals had in mind when it
said that if "later evidence disproves Plaintiffs' contentions that common
issues predominate, the district court can at that stage modify or
decertify the class."'1 16 Nothing has yet been decided, then, except that
the representatives might be able to provide evidentiary support for the
1 17
district court's certification order, nunc pro tunc.
The Wal-Mart approach is hardly unique; courts often certify cases
because they think representatives might ultimately prevail."' But a
certification hearing is not a summary judgment proceeding, at which a
court assures itself there is an issue for a fact finder to resolve at trial.119

114. Id. at 187.
115. Dukes II, 509 F.3d at 1193 ("The [district] court noted that Wal-Mart raised a number of
challenges to Plaintiffs' evidence of commonality but concluded that, in fact, most of these
objections related not to the Rule 23(a) requirement of commonality but to the ultimate merits of the
case and 'thus should properly be addressed by a jury considering the merits' rather than a judge
considering class certification.... We agree.").
116. Id. at 1176.
117. See id.
118. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The
question for the district court at the class certification stage is whether plaintiffs' expert evidence is
sufficient to demonstrate common questions of fact warranting certification of the proposed class,
not whether the evidence will ultimately be persuasive."); Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311,
316 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Allegations of similar discriminatory employment practices, such as the use of
entirely subjective personnel processes that operate to discriminate, satisfy the commonality and
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)."); Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir.
1982) ("The commonality requirement was satisfied because the following issue pervades all the
class members' claims-has Union National Bank discriminated against black employees by
denying them promotions and giving them lesser promotions than those given whites similarly
situated?"); In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 531-32 (M.D. Fla.
1996) (certification appropriate because "Plaintiffs have demonstrated at least a 'colorable method'
of proving [common injury] at trial.").
119. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) ("[A]t the summary judgment
stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.")
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It is a proceeding at which the court determines that the requirements of
Rule 23(a) are, or are not, satisfied. 20 If a court cannot make that
determination until
trial, it cannot, consistent with Rule 23, certify the
21
class before trial.'

The short shrift the Wal-Mart majority gave the adequacy of
representation requirement-which goes to "the competency of class
counsel and conflicts of interest"12 2-reinforces the impression that the
court was deferring serious consideration of the certification issue to a
later date. "Wal-Mart argued," the court said:
that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy [the adequacy of representation] factor
because of a conflict of interest between female in-store managers who
are both plaintiff class members and decision-making agents of WalMart. .

. [T]he district court recognized that courts need not deny

certification of an employment class simply because the class includes
both supervisory and non-supervisory employees. We agree. Finally,
because Wal-Mart does not challenge the district court's finding that
Plaintiffs' class representatives
and counsel are adequate, we need not
23
analyze this factor. 1

And with no more than
that, the court disposed of the adequacy of
24
representation inquiry.

120. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001) ("The success of the
1966 amendments (which are still in force) depends on making a definitive class certification
decision before deciding the case on the merits, and on judicial willingness to certify classes that
have weak claims as well as strong ones. A court may not say something like 'let's resolve the
merits first and worry about the class later' . . . or 'I'm not going to certify a class unless I think that
the plaintiffs will prevail."').
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee's note on 2003 amendments ("A court
that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until
they have been met.").
122. Gen. Tel. Co. ofthe Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
123. Dukes H, 509 F.3d 1168, 1185 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
124. Compare Dukes II, 509 F.3d at 1185 ("Finally, because Wal-Mart does not challenge the
district court's finding that Plaintiffs class representatives and counsel are adequate, we need not
analyze this factor."), with Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2001)
("Precedent and due process concerns require that courts protect potential class members by
ensuring that the named plaintiffs demonstrate their adequacy."), and In re GMC Pick-Up Truck
Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he court plays the important role
of protector of the absentees' interests, in a sort of fiduciary capacity, by approving appropriate
representative plaintiffs and class counsel."), and McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir.
1991) ("[T]he district court must constantly scrutinize class counsel to determine if counsel is
adequately protecting the interests of the class."), and Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925
F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[T]he fear that class actions will prove less beneficial to class
members than to their attorneys has been often voiced by concerned courts and periodically
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This pro forma treatment of the potential for conflicts of interest in
a class of 1.5 million people, united only by gender and employer, is too
obviously inadequate to be the court's considered judgment on the
subject. 125 The fact that a third of Wal-Mart's managers are class
members is by itself enough to prompt more discussion 126-people
challenging personnel decisions would not seem to have interests aligned
with those who made them127 -as is the representatives' decision to
waive their charges' right to compensatory damages.128
In sum, the Wal-Mart class action is a spurious class action with a
difference: the older procedure had no certification mechanism. This one
does, however, and, anyone who has been involved in certification

bolstered by empirical studies." (citations omitted)), and Stewart v. GMC, 756 F.2d 1285, 1293 (7th
Cir. 1985) ("[T]he district court has a fiduciary duty to protect the class members and thus motions
to substitute counsel must be carefully scrutinized.").
125. Cf Dukes 11,
509 F.3d at 1196 (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting).
The majority opinion ... [gives the adequacy requirement] little attention ....Based on

their own descriptions of the wrongs done to them in the complaint, the interests of the
seven named plaintiffs diverge from each other, as will the interests of other members of
the class. Women who still work at Wal-Mart and who want promotions have an interest
in the terms of an injunction. But an injunction and declaratory judgment cannot benefit
women who have quit or been fired and do not want to return. For them, compensatory
and punitive damages are what matter. Those who are managers, and many Wal-Marts
have female store managers, have interests in preserving their own managerial flexibility
under whatever injunction may issue, while those who are not and do not want to be
managers may not share this concern. Those who face strong defenses, such as if they
did indeed steal time or money, have a considerable interest in a fast, mass settlement,
while those who have impressive performance records have an interest in pushing their
individual cases to trial.
Id.
126. Dukes 11,509 F.3d at 1194 (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting) ("Plaintiffs' only evidence of sex
discrimination is that around 2/3 of Wal-Mart employees are female, but only about 1/3 of its
managers are female.").
127. Owners of property subject to a racially restrictive covenant seeking to enforce the
covenant:
could not be said to be in the same class with or represent those whose interest was in
resisting performance ....If those who thus seek to secure the benefits of the agreement
were rightly regarded . . . as constituting a class, it is evident that those ...

interested in

challenging the validity of the agreement . . . are not of the same class in the sense that
their interests are identical so that any group who had elected to enforce rights conferred
by the agreement could be said to be acting in the interest of any others who were free to
deny its obligation.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,44 (1940).
128. Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 721 (11th Cir. 2004) ("[T]o the extent the named
plaintiffs were willing to forego class certification on damages in order to pursue injunctive relief
that consisted of an admonition to follow general principles of settled law, it is far from clear that
the named plaintiffs would adequately represent the interests of the other putative class members."
(citation omitted)).
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proceedings knows how cumbersome they can be, and the drain they can
put on the resources of both the parties and courts. But, a certification
proceeding that does not settle anything is worse than none at all.
IV. USE THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE RIGHT JOB

The Supreme Court attributes at least three purposes to class
actions: resolving multiple claims in a single proceeding, allowing
people with small claims to share costs by presenting their claims in a

single proceeding, and bringing everyone with claims against a limited
fund before the court at the same time.

29

The Wal-Mart majority's

reference to the desirability of preventing "innumerable individual" suits
suggests the first, 30 but the dissent's observation that "the substantial
value of sex discrimination claims, the availability of lawyers on
made a class action
contingent fee, and statutory attorney's fees awards"
13
unnecessary, suggests it had the second in mind.

1

Many lower courts use Rule 23 for a third purpose, however,
enforcing statutes they deem important.

32

The Wal-Mart district court,

129. See supra note 7.
130. SeeDukeslI,509F.3dat 1193.
131. Id. at 1199 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (Class actions ....

are designed largely to solve an

attorneys' fees problem. . . . That need does not pertain here. . . . Many sex discrimination cases

satisfy the three elements that make a contingent fee case worth accepting, good liability, high
damages potential, and collectibility of a judgment, sweetened by the lagniappe of statutory
attorneys fees awards.... [W]omen discriminated against by Wal-Mart ... can, with contingent fee
agreements, afford to hire their own lawyers and control what the lawyers do for them."' (footnote
omitted) (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 420 (5th Cir. 1998))).
132. See, e.g., Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 109 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Class actions are a particularly
appropriate and desirable means to resolve claims based on the securities laws, since the
effectiveness of the securities laws may depend in large measure on the application of the class
action device." (quoting Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985))); Bowen v. First
Family Fin. Servs., 233 F.3d 1331, 1337 (1lth Cir. 2000) ("[A] class action is an available,
important means of remedying violations of the [Truth in Lending Act]."); Six Mexican Workers v.
Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[W]here the statutory objectives
include enforcement, deterrence or disgorgement, the class action may be the 'superior' and only
viable method to achieve those objectives .... "); Gay v. Waiters' Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th
Cir. 1977) (declaring that a trial court considering certifying a class action in a Title VII
employment discrimination case "must liberally interpret and apply Rule 23 so as not to undermine
the purpose and effectiveness of Title VII in eradicating class-based discrimination"); EEOC v.
Scolari Warehouse Mkts., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1145 (D. Nev. 2007) ("Though efficiency
may underlie the purpose of seeking class-wide relief, the interest in bringing a class action and/or a
pattern-or-practice claim is the same: to prevent against unlawful employment practices affecting a
group of individuals with related claims."); In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litig., 205
F.R.D. 229, 231 (D. Minn. 2001) ("Given 'the important role class actions play in the private
enforcement of antitrust actions, courts resolve doubts in these actions in favor of certifying the
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for example, prefaced its certification decision with the observation that
the plaintiffs were suing under a statute enacted
during the height of the civil rights movement [to forbid] gender and
race-based discrimination in the American workplace. Two years later,
federal class action rules were amended to facilitate the vindication of
these rights on a broader basis. . . Insulating our nation's largest
employers from allegations that they have engaged in a pattern and
practice of gender or racial discrimination-simply because they are
large-would seriously undermine these imperatives. Indeed, it is
interesting to note, as a matter of historical perspective, that Plaintiffs'
request for class certification is being ruled upon in a year that marks
the 50th anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education . . . . [which] serves as a reminder of the
importance of the courts in addressing the denial 133
of equal treatment
under the law wherever and by whomever it occurs.

This reasoning has roots in Ninth Circuit precedent,' 34 and the court
of appeals' willingness to base its commonality and typicality
determinations on evidence that cannot be evaluated until trial suggests
sympathy with the lower court's view. If its concern had been the
disposal of class members' claims one way or the other, it would not
have cared whether the representatives had evidence to support their
claim, for it would have thought a claim without evidentiary support as
appropriate for class treatment as any other. If its concern was with
enforcing statutory imperatives, however, it would presumably have

wanted to reserve a certification decision until it knew whether the
statute invoked by the plaintiffs needs enforcing. In that case, basing
commonality and typicality determinations on the representatives' ability

to prove their case makes sense, as does its admonition that "[i]f later

class."' (quoting In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 688-89 (D. Minn. 1995))); cf Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) ("For better or worse, the financial incentive
that class actions offer to the legal profession is a natural outgrowth of the increasing reliance on the
'private attorney general' for the vindication of legal rights; obviously this development has been
facilitated by Rule 23.").
133. Dukes , 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citations omitted), aff'd, 509 F.3d 1168
(9th Cir. 2007).
134. E.g., Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1306 ("[W]here the statutory objectives include
enforcement, deterrence or disgorgement, the class action may be the 'superior' and only viable
method to achieve those objectives ....");Gay, 549 F.2d at 1334 (9th Cir. 1977) (a trial court
considering certifying a class action in a Title VII employment discrimination case "must liberally
interpret and apply Rule 23 so as not to undermine the purpose and effectiveness of Title VII in
eradicating class-based discrimination.").
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evidence disproves [the] contentions that common issues predominate,
13135
the district court can at that stage modify or decertify the class ....
Still, the notion that a refusal to certify class actions insulates
employers from pattern-or-practice of discrimination claims is counterintuitive, as it suggests that Rule 23 creates a cause of action for patternor-practice claims for which only those invoking the Rule can seek
redress. That is obviously not the law; the Brown v. Board of
Education'36 decision cited by the trial court is a forceful reminder that
individuals injured by a pattern-or-practice of discrimination may seek
relief without qualifying as class representatives. 137
Were it otherwise, employers could defend against individual
claims of discrimination by showing that discrimination is company
policy, and one likes to think the Wal-Mart district court would make
short work of that defense and find all the authority it needs to enforce
the law with an injunction authorized by Rule 65.138 Thus, it makes no
sense to think of Rule 23 as anything but a way of resolving similar
claims that would otherwise have to be brought separately in repetitious
proceedings. Simply put, the Rule was designed to allow courts an
opportunity to determine before litigation if they can kill several birds
with one stone, not as a device for deputizing private attorney generals to
root out violations of the law.
Moreover, even if that were the purpose of the Rule, fundamental
considerations of federal jurisdiction would prevent district courts from
using Rule 23 to expand their ability to "facilitate the vindication of...
rights on a broader basis" than might be possible in an individual
action.1 39 Like any other plaintiff, a putative class representative must
establish his own Article III standing to challenge the acts or practices he
wants to put at issue, by showing that they aggrieved him personally. 40
That showing fixes the bounds of his lawsuit; Rule 23 will not permit
him to go beyond those bounds and challenge acts or practices that
aggrieved other people, but not him.14' He would not only lack common

135. Dukes 11,
509 F.3d at 1176.
136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
137. See Dukes 1,222 F.R.D. at 142.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
139. Dukes 1, 222 F.R.D. at 142 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); In re Monumental Life Ins.
Co., 365 F.3d 408, 417 n. 16 (5th Cir. 2004)).
140. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) ("[1]f none of the named plaintiffs
purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants,

none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.").
141.

See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997) ("Rule 23's requirements
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claims with those people, but also, more fundamentally,
he would lack
42
the Article III standing he needs to mount the attack.
Therefore, Rule 23 does not enhance a plaintiffs ability to seek out
and end illegal activity. If anything, a plaintiff's reach under Article III
may exceed his reach under Rule 23; a white person may protest
discrimination against blacks if it deprives him of the right to associate
with blacks, 43 but he is unlikely to qualify as a representative of those
blacks, too.'44 Class actions do broaden a court's power to award people
monetary compensation for wrongful acts the class representatives
prove, 45 which makes the Wal-Mart courts' approval of the decision to
waive the class members' right to seek compensatory damages all the
more surprising. But that broadening comes at a high price-the right of
people to present their own claims for themselves in their own way-and

must be interpreted in keeping with Article Ill constraints, and with the Rules Enabling Act, which
instructs that rules of procedure 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."'
(quoting Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000)); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 82 ("These rules
shall not be construed to extend or limit thejurisdiction of the United States district courts .... ").
142. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-25 (explaining that because of the "disparate questions
undermining class cohesion" in the case, there was not significant commonality between the class
members, so certification was denied); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) ("That a suit may
be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named plaintiffs who
represent a class 'must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has
been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they
purport to represent."' (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)));
Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n. 15 (1982) ("The mere fact that an aggrieved
private plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class of persons of the same race or national origin is
insufficient to establish his standing to litigate on their behalf all possible claims of discrimination
against a common employer.").
143. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972)
(permitting white tenants to sue apartment complex for excluding minority persons if they allege a
"loss of important benefits from interracial associations."); Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d
1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a statute forbidding discrimination in employment "grants
special protection to whites who are denied association with members of other groups because of an
employer's discriminatory practices"); Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist. 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th
Cir. 1989) (white woman had standing to complain that her employer"s discrimination against
blacks violated her right "to work in an environment free ofunlawful discrimination .... ").
144. Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 811 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[A] host of district
courts have refused to permit black females to represent black males in class actions alleging both
race and sex discrimination when a conflict of interest appears."); Strong v. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 496, 508 (E.D. Ark. 1980) ("Both evidenced and innate antagonisms
foreclose certifying these black female plaintiffs as representatives both of all blacks and all
females.").
145. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975) ("Courts of Appeals
that have confronted the issue are unanimous in recognizing that backpay may be awarded on a class
basis under Title VII without exhaustion of administrative procedures by the unnamed class
members.").
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adds nothing to the court's power to enforce statutes like Title VII. 146
Article III, as we have seen earlier, is not the only constitutional
constraint on the power of federal courts to conduct class actions; the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is a consideration, too. 141
The casual way in which many courts certify that the requirements of
Rule 23 are met suggests that they are counting on later judges to
repudiate their certification orders if things go1 48 wrong, but that is
gambling with other people's constitutional rights.
[The argument] that aggrieved class members can collaterally attack
the judgment ...is a smoke screen for justifying the blatant realization
that some litigants have not been or may not be afforded due process
under the procedures followed in the first case. It is, of course, far
better to utilize appropriate procedures at the first trial, then [sic] to
throw the burden upon the litigants who, in the face of a seemingly
validjudgment directly on the matter in controversy, must attempt to
regroup as a subclass and argue, after-the-fact, that they were not
adequately represented. Furthermore, allowing or encouraging liberal
collateral attacks on (b)(2) class actions [which do not require that class
members be given notice of their membership] defeats one of the
of achieving a finality
prominent purposes of class certification-that
1 49
of claims with respect to the defendants.
The district court judge who said this was confronted with the
dissatisfied members of a class certified in a case that led to what he
correctly called one of "the monumental decisions" in the early
development of employment discrimination law, yet they convinced him
that the earlier certification order "suffers ...from the plaintiffs' attempt
to include a broad class of litigants and yet prepare and advocate with
force the claims of some class members to the detriment of a distinct and
aggrieved alternate portion of the class. ' 5 ° Would that "monumental
decision" have been less effective in developing employment
discrimination law if the class had been more carefully tailored to the
requirements of due process?

146.

See Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984).

147. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
148. See Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 352 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated by 577
F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1978).
149. Id. at 352.
150. See id. at 351 (referring to Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1968)).
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For better or for worse, the modern Rule 23 was designed to strip
class members of a right that they had once enjoyed in spurious class
actions: the right to let others litigate for them, without losing the right to
litigate on their own. Procedural rules can change over time under the
incremental impact of court decisions, and that seems to be what has
happened to Rule 23-the notion that the 1966 amendments to the Rule
was designed to protect defendants is startling to many, if not most,
lawyers, who view it as a tool for bringing corporate miscreants to
justice. But, the design and shape of the rule imposes limits on the uses
to which it can be sensibly put; a claw hammer can be used to extract
screws from the wall, after all, but its design and shape guarantee that the
extraction will cause damage to the surrounding woodwork. The
woodwork surrounding Rule 23 is made up of constitutional values, and
ignoring the design of the Rule jeopardizes those values.
The Cooper litigation discussed earlier is a case in point; people
should not have to go to the Supreme Court to establish the obvious
point that "rejection of a claim of classwide discrimination does not
warrant the conclusion that no member of the class could have a valid
individual claim."' '
Yet, the Wal-Mart majority not only endorsed a
nation-wide pattern and practice claim, but made a point of saying the
district court could "conclud[e] that it would be better to handle this case
as a class action instead of clogging the federal courts with innumerable
individual suits litigating the same issues repeatedly." 152 In some future
case, when a former class member in Albany or Honolulu or Zanesville
comes forward with a claim overlooked in the ambition of the class
litigation, Wal-Mart's counsel will be remiss in their duty to their client
if they fail to argue that she has brought one of the "innumerable
individual suits" that the Wal-Mart majority had in mind. But, if the
plaintiff has the fortitude to press her claim, and if she can obtain counsel
to help her, she will most likely be able to carry her burden of showing
that the Wal-Mart court erred in certifying that she would be adequately
represented.
The design of Rule 23 also imposes non-constitutional limits on the
uses to which the Rule can be put. The certification procedures added by
subsection (a) of the modern Rule in 1966 often require courts and

151. See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 878.
152. Dukes 11, 509 F.3d 1168, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
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parties to invest considerable resources in making determinations about
the nature of the plaintiff's claim and its relationship to the claims of the
putative class members, in an effort to avoid the old spurious class
action. If those proceedings do not accomplish that end-if they do not
define a class whose members can win, as well as lose, a case-they are
a waste of everybody's time and resources. 5 3 Why not, if the real
certification decision is to be deferred until later, defer the certification
proceedings, too? That would do less violence to the purpose of Rule 23
than apparent compliance that is no compliance at all.
The threshold question at a certification hearing should, then, be:
why do the aspiring representatives think class members should be
bound if they lose? If the representatives have a convincing answer, and
if the other requirements of Rule 23 are met, the case can go forward as a
class action. Otherwise the court should confine itself to litigating the
claims of the people who have appeared in the case either personally or
through counsel and asked it to adjudicate their claims.

153. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[Federal rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.").
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